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Abstract
This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authen-
tication of m-length classical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic
code C[n,m, t]. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical secret key xAB, of n bits. Alice
creates n qubits based on the codeword and the key, that indicates the bases used to create each
qubit. The quantum states are sent to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel. We calculate
the failure probability of the protocol considering several types of attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication is a procedure to verify that a received message comes from a certain
entity, and have not been altered. Classical cryptography describes several techniques to
implement authentication. The Message Authentication Code (MAC) presumes the exis-
tence of a secret key shared among the two parts, A (Alice) and B (Bob). The coding
algorithm generates a tag, known as a cryptographic checksum, which is a function of the
message and the key. The tag is attached to the message. The recipient performs the
same calculation on the received message, using the same secret key, to generate a new tag
to be compared to the received tag. Identical tags indicate that the received message is
authentic [1].
The discovery and formalization of quantum mechanics during the last century motivated
studies in the fields of computation and information theories [2, 3, 4]. Effects like entangle-
ment and the discovery of EPR pairs made possible quantum states teleportation [5]. Some
problems computationally intractable in the classical world, as factorization, are solved using
polynomial algorithms running on a quantum computer. The development of such technol-
ogy would make unfeasible, for example, public key cryptographic systems, whose security
is based on the inefficiency of classical factorization algorithms [1]. One of the most interest-
ing applications of quantum information theory is quantum cryptography. In 1970, Wiesner
showed that quantum mechanics properties could be used for such end, but his work was
only published in 1983 [6]. Later, Bennett and Brassard described a quantum key distri-
bution protocol known as BB84 [7]. There exist several proofs of unconditional security of
BB84 [8, 9, 10], even against any collectives attacks [11].
Until the last decade, the expression “quantum cryptography” referred basically to pro-
tocols for quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, several researches have been made
in the sense of applying quantum mechanics resources in the resolution of others problems
related to the data security. The first works deals to the key verification [12] and user au-
thentication [13, 14, 15]. Key verification consists of assuring the legitimacy of the two parts
involved in a key distribution scheme, and that the established key is authentic. User au-
thentication, also called user identification, allows a system to determine the users identity
that wants to use it.
Curty and Santos [16] proposed a protocol to quantum authentication of unitary-length
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classical messages (bit). As for the secret key, they use a maximally entangled EPR pair
previously shared between Alice and Bob. For each message, an EPR pair is used. Alice
needs to generate, through a unitary operation, a quantum state, called quantum tag, which
depends on the qubit that represents the classical bit and her part of the EPR pair. For
the types of attacks discussed, the probability Pd that Eve deceives Bob was 0.5 ≤ Pd < 1,
depending on the choice of the unitary operation. Later, the same authors proposed a
protocol to quantum authentication of unitary-length quantum messages (qubit) [17]. The
second protocol is a generalization of the first, where the quantum tag now belongs to a
state space of dimension equal to or greater than the dimension of the message state space.
Recently, Barnum et al. [18] described a protocol to authenticate quantum messages
of length m. They propose a scheme that both enables Alice to encrypt and authenticate
(with unconditional security) an m qubit message by using a stabilizer code to encode
the message into m + s qubits, where the failure probability decreases exponentially in
the security parameter s. Such scheme requires a private key of size 2m + O(s) to be
shared between Alice and Bob. To archive this, the authors proposed a protocol for testing
the purity of shared EPR pairs. This protocol needs quantum circuits for the coding and
decoding operations.
In this paper we address the problem of authenticating classical messages of length m
transmitted over a noiseless quantum channel. We propose a non-interactive scheme that
just requires preparation of quantum states into orthornormal bases, transmission and mea-
surements of these states in the same bases. To reach a wished security level, the message
should be coded using a classical linear algebraic code C[n,m, t] [19]. After the coding op-
eration, Alice creates n qubits based on the chosen codeword and on a secret key of n bits,
xAB, previously shared with Bob. The key indicates the bases used by Alice and Bob for the
creation and measurement of the qubits. Bob assumes that no forgery has taken place and
that the message is authentic if the result of the measurement is a codeword c ∈ C[n,m, t].
We consider two types of attacks, the no-message and intercept-resend attacks. We calculate
the probability of a eavesdropping successfully forger a message to deceive Bob. As we will
show, this probability depends on the parameters n and t of the code C[n,m, t].
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II. A PROTOCOL TO QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION OF m-LENGTH CLAS-
SICAL MESSAGES
Suppose Alice wants to send Bob a m-bits certified message, ki, chosen from a set
K = {ki} = {0, 1}
m. Bob, when receiving the message, should be able to infer about
its authenticity, i.e., if the message was sent by Alice or not. The protocol described in
this section makes use of a classical linear algebraic code C[n,m, t] with parity check matrix
H , and a noiseless quantum channel for transmission of coded messages. For each message
ki ∈ K we associate a codeword ci ∈ C. Participants must share a classical secret key of n
bits, xAB, chosen in a random and independent way.
The authentication procedure is described as follows. Initially, Alice and Bob define
two orthonormal bases for the 2-dimension Hilbert space, Z = {|0〉, |1〉} and X = {|+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)}. When Alice needs to send the message kA, she computes
the corresponding codeword cA. For each bit of cA, Alice prepares a quantum state |ψj〉
based on the corresponding key bit. Then, if the j-th bit of xAB is 0, Alice prepares |ψj〉
using Z basis, such that
|ψj〉 =


|0〉 if the j-th bit of cA is 0
|1〉 if the j-th bit of cA is 1.
(1)
Similarly, if the j-th bit of xAB is 1, Alice prepares |ψj〉 using X basis, such that
|ψj〉 =


|+〉 if the j-th bit of cA is 0
|−〉 if the j-th bit of cA is 1.
(2)
After the qubits generation, Alice sends the state |ψj〉
⊗n to Bob through the quantum
channel.
At the reception, Bob makes measurements to obtain a sequence mB of n bits. For the
j-th received qubit, Bob measures it using the basis Z or X depending on the j−th bit of
xAB is 0 or 1, respectively. Because the quantum channel is perfect, Bob recognizes that the
message is authentic if mB is a codeword, i.e., mBH
T = 0. Then, Bob decodes mB to obtain
the authentic message. Otherwise, Bob assumes that Eve tried to send him an unauthentic
message. He then discards the received message. After each transmission, Alice and Bob
discard the key xAB.
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III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security of the proposed protocol, for the case of a noiseless
quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob. Two types of attacks will be considered: the
no-message attack and the intercept-resend attack. In the first one, Eve prepares a quantum
state and sends it to Bob. In the second, Eve intercepts the qubits and performs measure-
ments in attempting to obtain some information about the message sent by Alice. Then,
Eve exploits the information gained to prepare possibly another message that she sends to
Bob.
For the analysis, we consider that the linear code C and the mapping ki → ci are publicly
known, what is a realist assumption.
A. No-Message Attack
We analyze here the case where Eve precedes Alice and sends Bob a quantum state
|ψǫ〉 = |ψǫj〉
⊗n trying to impersonate Alice. Let Eve choose a message kE , with associated
codeword cE. Because Eve does not know anything about the key xAB, she chooses a random
sequence xE to indicate the bases used to create the qubits.
To calculate the protocols failure probability Pf , we define, for each message bit, three
events: ε1 = Eve chooses the same basis than Bob; ε2 = Eve chooses a different basis from
Bob; and ε3 = Bob obtain, after measurement, the same bit that Eve sent. The probability
Pf that Eve cheats Bob is therefore,
Pf = (P (ε3|ε1)P (ε1) + P (ε3|ε2)P (ε2))
n. (3)
The first conditioned probability, P (ε3|ε1), is equal to 1 due to the fact that, when Eve
chooses the same basis that Bob uses to measure the qubit, Bob will always obtain by the
measurement the same bit that Eve wished send to him. When Eve misses the basis, Bob
measures the same bit sent by Eve with probability P (ε3|ε2) = 1/2. Then,
Pf = (1×
1
2
+
1
2
×
1
2
)n
= (3/4)n. (4)
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B. Intercept-Resend Attack
In this type of attack, Eve segments the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, inter-
cepts and measures the quantum states that are being transmitted to Bob. Based on the
gained information, Eve prepares another message of her interest and sends it to Bob.
Since Eve has no information about the secret key xAB, she must initially choose her
bases sequence, called here xE , to measure the qubits. We investigate here an eavesdropper
strategy where Eve attempts to decode correctly the n bit string resulting from measure-
ments, to obtain the codeword sent by Alice. If Eve makes this successfully, she can exploit
the gained information to partially correct her key xE , forge an authentic message and send
it to Bob.
Suppose Alice generates the quantum state |ψj〉
⊗n based on the codeword cA, corre-
sponding to the message kA, and the classical secret key xAB shared with Bob. Initially,
we calculate the probability Pdec of Eve decodes successfully the bit string resulting from
measurements to obtain cA. To perform this, we employ the error correction properties of
the code C together with our strategy to create the quantum states. Let mE the n-bits
sequence resulting of Eves measurements using her key xE randomly generated. Define the
random variable X = number of bits of Eves key xE , that coincides with the bits of Alice
and Bobs key xAB. If e = mE + cA is the error vector when Eve measures |ψj〉
⊗n, then
Pdec = P (w(e) ≤ t)
=
n−t−1∑
i=0
P (X = i)P (w(e) ≤ t|X = i)
+
n∑
i=n−t
P (X = i), (5)
where w(e) stands for error vector Hamming weight [19]. Because if Eves bases sequence xE
matches xAB in n− t− 1 or more positions, then the error vector weight is always less than
or equal to t, i.e., P (w(e) ≤ t|X = i) = 1 since i ≥ n− t.
It is straightforward to see that X has a binomial distribution with p = 1/2,
P (X = i) =
(
n
i
)
(1/2)i(1/2)n−i
=
(
n
i
)
2−n. (6)
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Thus, for any realization of X , X = i, Eve knows with probability one that i bits of mE
are correct bits. Among n− i remaining bits of mE , Eve should measure correctly at least
n− i− t bits to be able to correct the word. But, if Eve misses the basis, she has probability
p = 1/2 of still obtain the correct bit. So, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− t− 1
P (w(e) ≤ t|X = i) =
t∑
h=0
(
n− i
n− i− h
)
(1/2)n−i−h(1/2)h
=
t∑
h=0
(
n− i
n− i− h
)
2−(n−i). (7)
The probability Pdec is then
Pdec =
n−t−1∑
i=0
t∑
h=0
(
n
i
)(
n− i
n− i− h
)
2−(2n−i)
+
n∑
i=n−t
(
n
i
)
2−n. (8)
The decoding probability found above depends on the parameters n and t of the chosen
code. Once Eve decodes successfully the codeword sent by Alice, there is an increase on
the failure probability of the system. This is because Eve gains information from Alice and
Bob’s secret key, allowing Eve partially corrects its key xE . To achieve this, she compares
the bits of mE with the bits of cA. Eve concludes that chose wrong bases in the positions
where mE differ with cA. She then flips the incorrect bits of xE to obtain a new key x
′
E .
For the scenario described above, it is possible to calculate the systems failure probability.
Assume that when Eve decodes a message correctly, she corrects t positions of xE . Define
the events: εi = Eve guesses i positions of xAB and decodes mE correctly; ε = Bob accepts
the received message as authentic. If Eve chooses a message to transmit and creates the
quantum state |ψE〉
⊗n based on the corresponding codeword and the corrected key xE , the
protocols failure probability P ′f can be written as
P ′f =
n−t−1∑
i=0
P (ε|εi)P (εi) +
n∑
i=n−t
P (εi). (9)
When Eve guesses more than n− t− 1 bases, she decodes the message correctly, and she
can correct entirely its key to obtain x′E = xAB. Therefore, Eve always deceives Bob, i.e.,
P (ε|εi) = 1 for n− t ≤ i ≤ n.
To calculate the conditioned probability P (ε|εi), it is enough to notice that i bits of xAB
were initially correct and t bits were corrected. Therefore, there exists w(xAB+xE) = n−t−i
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incorrect bits in xE . Although Eve misses the basis, there is a probability equals to 1/2 of
Bob measures the same bit sent by Eve, so that
P (ε|εi) = 2
−(n−t−i). (10)
The probability P (εi) it was previously discussed [Eqs. (7) and (8)]. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n−t−1,
P (εi) =
t∑
h=0
(
n
i
)(
n− i
n− i− h
)
2−(2n−i), (11)
and for i ≥ n− t,
P (εi) =
(
n
i
)
2−n, (12)
so that the probability P ′f is
P ′f =
n−t−1∑
i=0
t∑
h=0
(
n
i
)(
n− i
n− i− h
)
2−(3n−2i−t)
+
n∑
i=n−t
(
n
i
)
2−n. (13)
IV. PROTOCOL SUMMARY
Considering that Alice and Bob share a random secret key xAB and they agree on a
linear algebraic code C[n,m, t], the proposed protocol for quantum authentication of classical
messages can be summarized as follows:
1. Alice chooses cA ∈ C corresponding to kA.
2. Alice creates n qubits in the bases Z or X , depending on xAB. She sends the qubits
through the quantum channel.
3. Bob chooses the bases used in the measurements according with xAB. The measurement
results is a n-bits sequence mB.
4. Bob performs a parity test on mB. Case mBH
T 6= 0, the message is discarded (Eve
interfered in the channel). If mB passes the parity test (mBH
T = 0), Bob obtains
the message kA decoding mB = cA.
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TABLE I: Security of the protocol for some binary BCH codes.
C[n,m, t] Pf PDec P
′
f
C[63,57,1] 1.3 × 10−8 4.1× 10−15 2.8× 10−13
C[63,51,2] 1.3 × 10−8 4.4× 10−16 5.5× 10−13
C[63,18,10] 1.3 × 10−8 3.1× 10−9 3.2× 10−9
C[63,10,13] 1.3 × 10−8 3.7× 10−7 3.7× 10−7
C[127,120,1] 1.4× 10−16 3.0× 10−32 2.4× 10−26
C[127,113,2] 1.4× 10−16 5.0× 10−34 4.8× 10−26
C[127,36,15] 1.4× 10−16 1.0× 10−20 1.1× 10−20
C[127,22,23] 1.4× 10−16 1.8× 10−14 1.8× 10−14
V. DISCUSSION
According with the analyses presented in the section III, the security of our protocol
depends on the parameters n and t of the linear algebraic code C[n,m, t] chosen. Moreover,
the failure probabilities can be made as small as wished. To have an idea of such security,
we calculated the probabilities discussed for several binary BCH codes of lengths n = 63
and n = 127 [19] (Table I).
When the message to be send is a random sequence of bits, the classical message authen-
tication codes (MAC) presents only a computational security, even when a larger key is used
to produce the authentication block [1]. The class of protocols described here presents an
information theoretic security, rather than based on computational assumptions.
The size of the used secret key is another important aspect. In general, if R = m/n is the
rate of the linear code C[n,m, t], the length of the key will be 1/R times the length of the
message. For example, for the code C[127, 120, 1], it is only necessary a key whose length is
(127/120) ∼= 1, 06 times the length of the message to guarantee, in the worst case, a failure
probability of 1.4× 10−16.
Moreover, there exists a possibility of reusing the secret key for Alice and Bob, since in
quantum systems it is possible to identify an attempt to perturbing the states transmitted
through the channel. If the quantum channel can be considered perfect and Bob receives an
authentic message, he can conclude that no eavesdropper was present. Then, the secret key
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can be reused without compromise the security of the protocol.
Comparatively to others quantum schemes to authenticate classical messages present in
the literature, the protocol described here has advantages in terms of simplicity and use of
quantum resources. The Curty and Santos’s protocol needs a quantum operation to generate
a quantum tag to be send attached to the message. Moreover, the security of such protocol
depends on the choice of the unitary operation. However, the authors did not show the
existence of a optimum unitary operation that minimize the failure probability [16].
A disadvantage of our scheme is the use of a classical secret key. This means that it
is possible to read or copy the key by a third part during storage process, without being
detected. This problem will only be solved with the improvement of equipments to storage
quantum states.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we presented a simple, but efficient non-interactive scheme for quantum
authentication of m-length classical messages. The described protocol make uses of a linear
algebraic code C[n,m, t] to encode the message and a classical secret key of n bits. The
quantum states are created based on the codeword, where the key bits are used to choose
the bases. Then, the qubits are transmitted through a quantum channel.
According with quantum mechanics theory and considering the systematic adopted in
the quantum states creation, the protocols failure probabilities were calculated. In general,
these probabilities depend on the choice of the parameters n and t of the code, and we can
make them as small as desired. The security of the proposed protocol does not depend,
therefore, on computational assumptions.
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